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Government Regulation of Coal Mine
Health and Safety
by Jean Doerr
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article was prepared prior to the
methane gas explosion in the Dutch Creek No. 1 mine. The
dxplosion emphasizes the importance qf the issues qf miners'
safrty presented in Ms. Doerr's article. The editors hope that
the death qf.f fteen miners will stimulate moreoeJ'ctive safety
measures in the mining industly.
Coal mining is the most hazardous industrial job in the
United States. It is more hazardous than mining in most
of the major coal producing countries of the world. A coal
'miner today is seven times more likely to be killed on thejob than the average American worker, and American
miners are two and a half times more likely to be killed on
the job than miners in England. "In the 100 years that
partial records of fatal mine accidents have been kept (the
early figures are incomplete) more than 120,000 men
have died violently in coal mines, an average of 100 every
month for a century". (Ben A. Franklin, New York
Times reporter, quoted in Voices.from the Mountains).
The problem of coal mine safety and health is historic.
We need no. additional studies to delineate the scope or
extent of the problem. Unlike other regulated industries
where the pervasiveness or sometimes even the essential
nature of the hazards involved remain in controversy, the
fact of disability and death in our nation's mines defines
the issue with a disturbing clarity. There nonetheless
remains little or no unity among industry, labor, and
government regarding truly effective solutions.
The mining industry may well be the oldest federally
regulated industry in the country. Such regulation is
marked by three fairly distinct features. First, safety
regulation in the coal mines is reactive intervention; in
nearly every case involving significant government
action, such action has been precipitated by an outcry
following a mining disaster of unusual proportion. The
most recent example has been the 1968 mine disaster in
Farmington, West Virginia. After a methane explosion
killed 78 miners, the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Safety and
Health Act, which had theretofor been languishing in
Congress, was passed and signed within the following
month.
The second feature of mine safety and health regulation
is again not unique to this particular exercise of govern-
ment intervention into private industry. The history of
mine safety and health regulation and the enforcement of
standards is a study in the effective "capture" of the
regulatory scheme by the regulated industry. From the
earliest days when mine regulation was charged to the
pro-production Department of the Interior through the
1969 Act administered at its inception by a pro-manage-
ment Nixon Administration, advocates of safety and
health have perpetually taken a back seat to those who
would seek to protect capital first, miners second.
The third characteristic is important in understanding
the vicissitudes of coal mine safety and health regulation:
Injury and death in the mines is directly related to the
The third characteristic is important in understanding
the vicissitudes of coal mine safety and health regulation:
Injury and death in the mines is directly related to the
erratic production trends prevalent in the industry. Pro-
ductive mines are not always safe mines and, when indus-
try prospers, the need for restrictive regulation aimed
toward the protection of miners' safety is greatest.
Although the correlation between erratic production
cycles and the rise in the number of accidents and deaths
in the mines is one which is readily apparent, it is not a
parallel which is frequently drawn. The reasons are
obvious. The strength of an industry upon which we are
increasingly relying for our domestic energy indepen-
dence in the 1980's is seemingly incompatible with the
articulated goal of Congress in establishing federal mine
safety regulation; the need to protect the "most precious
resource - the miner". (Federal Coal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, 30 USC § 2). Industry most often
acknowledges (albeit inadvertently) the correlation
between production and accidents by showing figures
which indicate a precipitous drop in coal production
following passage of the Federal Coal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1969. Production admittedly dropped but so
did the number of fatal accidents following the passage of
the act. A safe mine they would seem to argue is indeed
not a productive mine. It then follows that it is impossible
to produce coal at a rate which will meet industrial amd
national enegy needs, insure'generous profit margins
and at the same time protect the lives of miners. This per-
ceived conflict too often produces compromises in the
enforcement of established regulations; compromises
which leave miners with far fewer protections than those
envisioned by mine safety advocates.
The regulatory status quo in the area of mine health and
safety is some improvement over past solutions. None-
theless, mine disasters continue to occur and will occur
with a frequency that will certainly parallel any increase in
coal production, provided the current patterns of produc-
tion are left unregulated. The somewhat gloomy predic-
tion is not a concession to those who would assert that
there is an "inherent danger" in the production of coal
but rather an understahding that safety and health cost
money and profits will, under the present approach,
always be protected first.
The Problem: In November of 1968 a methane gas explo-
sion ripped through the number 9 mine of the Consolida-
tion Coal Company near Farmington, West Virginia, kill-
ing 78 miners. Standing among the families and friends of
those miners who were killed, waiting for word of possible
survivors, Tony Boyle, then president of the United Mine
Workers of America, said, "As long as we mine coal there
is always this inherent danger."
"Every mine disaster in America is followed
by an appeal to fate by the mourning coal com-
panies... after a faulty dam broke over Buffalo
Creek (W. Va.) . . . washing away an entire
valley and over a hundred people, a spokes-
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men for the Pittston Company which,built the
dam called it 'an act of God' . . . similar
religious dramas are played out for more than
200 dead miners each year." (J. Davitt
McAteer You Can't Buy Sqa]'y at the Company
Store, The Washington Monthly, Nov. 1972)
Mine accidents are not acts of gods. They are caused by
poorly maintained equipment, disregard for safety
measures and inadequate miner training. The vast
majority of accidents are clearly the fault of coal com-
panies; companies whose production practices are incon-
sistent with the necessary care required to insure a safe
and healthy working mine.
A coal miner today is 'seven
times more likely to be killed on
the job than the average
American worker....
An analysis of coal mining accidents compiled by the
staff of the Division of Mining Information Systems
Health and Safety Analygis Center contains a classifica-
tion scheme which categorizes all reported mine accidents
according to 21 identifiable accident circumstances or
accident types. In 1978, deaths resulted most often from
roof falls. Powered haulage equipment was responsible for
the second greatest number of deaths, followed by electri-
cal accidents and falls of the face, rib, pillar, side or high-
wall. Methane explosions are not the most common cause
of death in mines, they simply kill with a drama which
more than adequately illustrates the danger of coal min-
ing. And mine accidents are not always confined to the
working area. An accident, classified by the Mine Infor-
mation Systems Health and Safety Analysis Center, as
being caused by "an unstable condition or failure of an
impoundment, refuse pile or culm bank requiring
emergency preventive action or evacuation of an area"
occurred in 1972. In an article which appeared in the
Washington Monthly in May of 1972, Tom Bethell and J.
Davitt McAteer described such an accident as follows.'
"When coal comes out of the earth there is
refuse, rock and other material. It is sorted out
before the coal is loaded into railroad cars and
trucked away to be dumped wherever conve-
nient. The dump - called a 'gob pile' or 'slag
heap' grows steadily. Over a time it may
stretch hundreds of yards across an entire
valley, growing hundredS of feet high as the
dumping continues."
A gob pile stretching across a valley is an obvious solu-
tion to the problem of how best to store and re-use the
vast quantities of water required by coal preparation
operations. Operators in Buffalo Creek, West Virginia,
reasoned that since the pile of coal waste refuse looked
like a dam it could in fact be used as a dam. Unfortunately
gob piles, although waste, are composed of flammable
wastes. A fire which starts deep within a gob pile will
smolder, burn slowly and occasionally explode. On
February 26, 1972, the gob pile dam used by the Pittston
Coal Company did explode, sending "21 million cubic
feet of water and an immeasurable mass of mud and r6cl,
and coal wastes... charging through the narrow valley ol
Buffalo Creek." In the end, 16 communities were
destroyed and 125 people were killed.
The keys to improved mine safety are properly main-
tained machinery, an insistence upon adherence to
prescribed and improved mining plans, required con-
pliance with at least minimum safety standards, a
modicum of training for new miners, retraining for
experienced miners who switch to new jobs and mainte-
nance of production at a moderate and steady pace. The
promulgation of equipment standards or the establish-
ment of miner training requirements, however, are not by
themselves sufficient solutions. It is becoming increasing-
ly imperative to look at the effect of erratic production
cycles on conditions in the mines and note that in the
absence of production controls all the safety regulation
possible will produce little significant improvement.
Production Patterns: Throughout its historythe coal
industry has been distinguished by pronounced and
erratic production and employment cycles. "Between
1948 and 1968, average coal prices fluctuated within the
narrow band of $4.39 to $5.08 per ton." (Collective
Bargaining, Contemporary American Experience,
I.R.R.A. 1980). Railroads and our nation's cities grew and
prospered as the result of this "cheap coal". With the
introduction of alternative fuels such as oil and natural
gas, reliance on coal declined. Productivity dropped and
unemployment soared. By the 1970's coal was no longer
cheap.
While coal was cheap, working conditions in the mines
were hazardous. Aggressive competition among a large
number of producers created a climate for the rapid
urbanization of America. The ruthless fight lor a share of
the market, however, guaranteed minimum expenditures
on health and safety.
The prevailing conditions in the industry today are
much different from those which existed in the years
before the dramatic changes which led to modernization
of the mines. Coal production is highly centrali/ed and
unlike decades ago when the industry was characterized
by competition among a vast number of producers only a
few large companies today share a substantial percentage
of the total coal production in our country. Nonetheless,
erratic production cycles survive. Coal mining is still very
much a boom or bust industry. And with each precipitous
rise in production comes the inevitable and predictable
rise in injury and death. In 1975, for example, the "pro-
duction of 640 million tons was the largest since 1947. At
that production level 152 American miners (lied - twen-
ty more than in 1974. And during the lirst 10 months of
1975 nearly 9,000 miners suffered injuries, a total up
1,600 from the year before." ( The Coal Booni: au'qtlv and
Tonnage, The Nation, March 1976)
Production increases do not simply or solely follow
increased market demand. A production increase over the
short run, or stock-piling, is a common industry tactic in
the arena of labor relations. Coal producers, as a matter of
course, prepare for UMIWA contract negotiations monthi
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before the expiration of the prior contract; in anticipation
of a strike, companies will dramatically increase produc-
tion in an effort to create reserves which, in turn, will ena-
ble operators to wait out a strike without the attendant
loss of profits. The result of stockpile building is that
striking miners will usually-reach the breaking point well
before the companies do. In December of 1977, when the
Mine Workers went out on strike after contract negotia-
tions failed, there was a reported 100 million tons of coal
on the ground (stockpiled). Reserves of that size enabled
operatqrs to wait out a strike lasting 111 days. In the early
part of 1981, in anticipation of contract renewal
difficulties, operators had amassed a reported 200 million
tons of coal on the ground, over an estimated four-month
period of time. The duration of the current strike remains
to be seen. It is nonetheless apparent that the practice of
stockpiling has all but rendered the union's single most
effective weapon useless.,
When the companies push production over the short
run, safety inevitably suffers. A stable and safe mining
environment depends in large part upon steady and pre-
dictable work practices. When production goals are
emphasized, miners are directed to work longer, faster or
on jobs for wht-ch they are undertrained or unqualified.
Production peaks may necessitate the hiring of new,
undertrained and inexperienced workers. When increased
production goals are set, it becomes more likely that cor-
ners will be cut on the maintenance of equipment; less
time is spent on rock dusting and clean-up before and
after shifts. Supplies fall short and roof bolters are
required to use shorter bolts or inadequate timbers. When
the focus is on production, time may not be set aside to
adequately test methane gas levels or perform other, sim-
ple and yet time consuming safety tasks. Pre-shift
examinations of the working face may be perfunctory or
ignored altogether and pre-work shift meetings may be
discouraged or dispensed with because of the time
involved.
Erratic production patterns are the rule and not the
exception. Erratic production trends create a climate for
increased accidents and they do, in fact, result in an
increased number of injuries and fatalities.
Existing Solutions: Mine accidents and disasters are
avoidable and improved safety is well within operators'
control. The solptions to date have taken two basic forms
- government intervention in the form of regulatory
legislation and union representation with attendant col-
lective bargaining protections. Both, in many cases, mir-
ror one another or overlap. They are dealt with
individually, however, because the approaches represent
divergent underlying premises regarding the problem of
safety in the coal mines. The government's position, it is
suggested, is rooted in a basic pro-production concern,
with the apparent result that little connection has ever
been drawn between production patterns and accidents.
Government intervention into the coal industry began
first under the auspices of the production oriented Bureau
of Mines and was later transferred to the Department of
the Interior. It remained there until 1977 when the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1977
transferred enforcement from the Department of
Interior's Mine Enforcement Sa 'ety Administration
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(MESA) to the Mine Safety and Health Administration(MSHA) in the Department of Labor.
Though administration and enforcement of mine safety
regulations is now charged to a comparatively pro-worker
agency, it is nonetheless the Mine Safety and Health
Administration's position that there is no correlation bet-
ween erratic production cycles and increased accidents
and fatalities. "A safe mine" officials assert, "can be a
productive mine". While admitting that such a position is
central to their ability to sell the need for additional
regulation or improved enforcement to Congress and big
operators, (those opposed to federal mine safety regula-
tion argue that such controls depress production), such
obvious constraint is not considered to be a significant
influence in their overall strategy.
The United Mine Workers of America, by contrast,
made the productive-injury connection relatively early.
John L Lewis, throughout his tenure as president of the
UMWA, recognized the adverse effect of sporadic over-
production and would in fact frequently direct work slow-
downs or stoppages to stabilize coal production
throughout the industry. In 1949, for example, when
"industry was facing itschronic problem of overproduc-
tion", Lewis called for a one-week stabilizing work stop-
page. "This period of inaction" he said, "will emphasize a
lack of general stability in the industry and the dangers
which will accrue therefrom if current harmful practices
are not remedied." (Miernyk, Coal, Collective Bargain-
ing: Contemporary American Experience)
Regulation: Federal regulation of the coal industry is
"reactive"; significant government intervention has
generally been preceeded by, indeed precipitated by, pub-
lic outcry following mining disasters of unusual propor-
tion.
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The legislation of 1910,, which created the Bureau of
Mines some forty years after its initial proposal, was won
at the cost of thousands of miners' lives. In 1907 there
occurred two of the most awesome mining disasters in our
nation's history. In that year, a methane explosion killed
358 miners in Monogah, West Virginia. The casualty list,
however, included only those officially recognized as
employees of the coal company. "In the early years of the
century.. . a miner was paid for all the tonnage produced
in his section". He would therefore hire assistants who
worked for him. Company payrolls, as a result, accounted
for "a fraction of men working in the mines. Unofficial
counts of those killed at Monogah number between 620
and 956." (NYDEN, Miners for Democracy: Struggle in
the Coal Field 1975) A second explosion that year took
236 lives in a mine in Jacobs Creek, Pennsylvania. Again
236 was only the official count.
When the Bureau of Mines was first created, it was
charged with providing government assistance to the
states and to operators in coal mining research aimed at
increasing production through improved mining tech-
niques. A secondary focus of the Bureau was the reduc-
tion or prevention of accidents. The legislation which cre-
ated the Bureau however,"was not only devoid of any
enforcement authority but it expressly denied Bureau
employees any authority to inspect or supervise a mine or
any phase of mine related operations." (McCulloch, West
Va. L. Rev. Symposium on Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Regulations 1977) It was perhaps one of the most
benign forms of government intervention imaginable.
The next piece of federal regulatory legislation was
Public Law 77-49, passed in 1941 after three separate
methane explosions killed 199 miners. The 1941 Act gave
Bureau employees authority to make inspections in con-junction with state conducted investigations or enfor'ce-
ment actions, and to publicize their findings. Regulation
of mining conditions still, however, lay solely with state
agencies. The 1941 legislation did not allow for indepen-
dent federal action and was not a grant of regulatory
power. It was legislation designed simply to supplement
the work of state agencies.
In 1946 the first mine safety code for bituminous coal
and lignite mines was passed. The Bureau of Minds,
however, still had no enforcement power. The code
presumably was intended only as a tool in seeking volun-
tary compliance from operators.
In 1951, 119 miners died in an explosion at the Orient
Mine in West Frankfort, Illinois. Not surprisingly, in
1952 Congress passed the second major piece of mining
legislation. It constituted the first major step toward the
establishment of effective federal regulation. The 1952
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 66 Stat. 692,
gave federal inspectors authority to enter mines without
the owners' consent, to write notices of violation, and ,to
issue closure orders when ultra-hazardous conditions pre-
senting an imminent danger were found to exist. The law,
in spite' of the advances it represented over previously
enacted legislation, was still fairly weak. Its application
was restricted only to those mines employing more than
fifteen underground workers and its orientation was pri-
marily toward highly dangerotis conditions which created
the risk of a major disaster and not toward those an
'inspector might reasonably believe posed a lesser danger.
In addition, as a practical matter, the Bureau rarely issued
a closure order for failure to abate, and if the operator was
making any effort at all to abate he was usually immune
from closure orders. And again, as was the case with the
1941 legislation, most regulatory enforcement authority
still lay with state agencies.
In 1966, the 1952 Act was amended by Public Law 89-
376 to include smaller mining operations and to give
inspectors authority to issue closure orders for repeated
violations or what was later categorized as "unwarranta-
ble failure" to abate a dangerous condition.
The next major piece of federal coal mine safety legisla-
tion was passed by Congress in 1969. The 1969 Act was
passed in response to a vociferous public outcry following
the mine explosion in Farmington, West Virginia, in
which 78 miners lost their lives. Out of the rubble of the
Farmington disaster, grew a grassroots effort to marshall
improved miner health and safety Iegislation through
Congress and across the President's desk. The Federal
Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969 was passed by
Congress and sent to the President in late December of
1968, a month after the Farmington disaster. There was
every reason to believe that President Nixon Would veto
the bill particularly after administration-led attempts on
the floor to send the bill back to committee failed. On
December 30, however, seven widows of Farmington
miners went to the White House and confronted Nixon,
(Confinited on page 21)
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1969 Act, the 1977 legislation being simply amendments
to the then existing regulatory scheme. What had pro-
mised to be one of the more effective changes in the law
was the shift of mine safety enforcement from Interior to
Labor. The attitudinal changes anticipated were thought
to be decisive in any realized improvement in miner
safety. The UMWA, in an April 1978 assessment of the
1977 Act expressed a hope that DOL's involvement
would "inject a new sense of mission into mine safety and
health matters." Under the Reagan administration,
however, coal mine safety and health regulation will no
doubt stffer the same fate as other management opposed
occupational safety and health programs.
There is little written to date, regarding enforcement
performance under he 1977 Federal Coal Mine Safety and
Health Act, and any assessment would of necessity have
to be viewed in the light of two significant factors which
will predictably impact negatively on the Act's effective-
ness. The first factor to be considered is the priority
granted to occupational safety and health by the Reagan
administration. Without much elaboration it is sufficient
to say that the members of the current administration
have long considered safety regulation to be a wholly
impermissible government intrusion into the realm of
management prerogatives. The sec6nd negative factor is
the move of "captive" coal operations into the compete-
tive coal market. A captive mine is a mine owned and
operated by a coal consumer. Captive coal producers/con-
sumers are steel makers, chemical companies and electric
utilities. Until recently the captive mines have produced
only enough coal to meet their own needs. As a result,
production has been steady and predictable. The impor-
tant factor is that captive coal production has been
relatively immune from the erratic and dangerous pro-
duction patterns that prevail in the competitive coal
market. In addition, and by contrast to operators for
whom the production of coal is their major concern and
source of income, captive operators (steelmakers for
example) have experience with industrial safety in an
independent context. Safety training in captive operations
therefore tends to be better, more thorough and com-
paratively free from the institutional "inherent danger"
bias which colors any attempted mine health and safety
efforts. The combined effect of these factors: i.e.,
immunity from erratic production patterns and indepen-
dent safety training experience, is that captive operations
have had comparatively good safety records. Poor
economic conditions in recent years, however have con-
vinced captive operators that there is more profit to be
made in the competitive market. With steel production
down, for example, the coal reserves owned by
steelmakers are- an untapped source of capital. The
introduction of captive operators into the competitive
market will no doubt result in an overall increase in mine
accidents and fatalities.
The Role of the UMWA: The United Mine Workers of
America has had a major impact on health and safety
legislation. The UMWA position on the issue of miners'
safety is today, uncompromising - "Coal will be mined
safely or not at all." That certainty and direction,
however, has not always prevailed.
From the early 20's to 1961 while John L. Lewis was
president of the UMWA, attention was focused on efforts
to stabilize the industry. Lewis recognized that prevailing
production patterns were erratic and ultimately
dangerous. While in the past Lewis used work stoppages
or slow downs in an effort to stabilize production, long
term remedies became increasingly imperative as mine
technology began to change.
From the mid-1940's into the 1950's operators were
belatedly heralding the arrival of the 20th century and
Lewis was there to make sure it arrived on his terms.
Recognizing that large scale mechanization would elimi-
nate a vast number of jobs, Lewis negotiated an agree-
ment, through the secretary of the Interior, Julius Krug,
which provided for the establishment of a welfare and
retirement fund -to compensate displaced miners.
Although, throughout this period, questions of, health
and safety appeared to take a back seat to employment
and production stabilization, the latter issues were
necessarily preliminary problems which had to be solved
first. To assert rights which are essentially individual
rights; i.e. safe and healthy working conditions, the union
had to do so from a position of strength. Lewis' legacy was
to bring that strength to the bargaining table and to
institutionalize the role of the UMWA in setting condi-
tions under which coal would be mined in this country.
The 1978 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
was ratified by a striking membership after a work stop-
page which lasted 111 days. Labor did not, in total, do
very well. With regard to health and safety however, there
are several major portions of the contract which address
the problem and which form a strong and clear position
seemingly free from assault in any future negotiations.
The 1978 contract safety provisions represent a clear
recognition of the importance of protecting individual
safety rights (an approach only lately embraced by
government regulators). The agreement further reflects a
realization that contractual solutions, to be effective,
must be explicit and well defined. To the extent that
responsibilities are clearly delineated, the opportunity to
administratively circumvent the intent of the protections
offered is greatly diminished. The 1978 contract also
reflects an understanding of the importance of training as
a solution to the problem of mine safety. The safety and
health provisions negotiated in the 1978 ageement take
very much the same form as those contained in the 1974
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. (It is
unknown at this time whether a 1981 agreement will keep
the safety features of the 1978 and 1974 agreements
intact). The negotiated provisions also mirror amend-
ments to the 1969 Act made effective in the 1977 legisla-
tion. The overall effect is that federal law and regulations
extend, in many respects, essential UMWA contract
rights to non-union miners. The law thus can only aid
union miners to the extent that it is enforced more
stringently or administered more effectively than the con-
tract itself.
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Alternative Solutions: The coal industry has been the
focus of federal regulation since its very earliest days. This
concession to a regulatory solution to unsafe mining con-
ditions may, however, simply be the result of inertia and
not the product of a well reasoned assessment of possible
approaches.-
A comparison of coal mines in this country with Euro-
pean mining operations reveals that U.S. mines are easily
the most productive in the world. "American coal indus-
try publicists are fond of pointing out that the American
coal mine produces more than twice as much coal per shift
as his British counterpart, more than five times as much
as a West German and nearly 10 times as much as the
average Russian miner". (Overkill: A Report on Mine
Safety and Health, Coal Patrol, 1972). What the publica-
tions fail to mention however, is that the rate of U.S. coal
production also kills miners, and kills them with an alarm-
ing frequency.
Geological surveys reveal that U.S. mines are typically
only a few hundred feet deep; "Coal is removed from a
seam running horizontally, generally without much dip-
ping or pitching, and the seam is normally between three
and six feet deep". (Coal Patrol, 1972). Compared to
most European mines, those are ideal conditions. "Euro-
pean coal seams are two to four thousand feet down. The
seams are often less than three feet thick. Roof conditions
- - under the massive weight of thousands of feet of over-
burden - - can be extremely hazardous. The seams often
dip and pitch posing severe maneuvering problems for
machinery. And making matters still worse, European
coal seams are heavily saturated with methane". (Coal
Patrol, 1972) In spite of such conditions, European coal
operations are safer than U.S. mines. Clearly the industry,
by virtue of adverse geological factors, has been forced to
tailor their mining practices to prevailing conditions. The
result is the development of sophisticated technology far
in advance of U.S. coal mining technology. By comparison
with European mining operations the room-and-pillar
method of extracting coal used in this country seems
hopelessly archaic and dangerous. The European
developments are newer and markedly safer, indicating
that a possible solution to unsafe mining conditions in this
country may be in the area of improved technology.
There are four major mining methods now used in
European mines which, if adopted in this country, would
have a marked impact on mining conditions: longwall
mining, explosion barriers, water infusion, and methane
drainage.
Described briefly, "longwall mining is a method
whereby coal is removed by a cutting machine traveling
from one end of the coal face to the other ... mined coal
drops onto a conveyor belt running the length of the coal
face, parallel to the cutting machine and is carried to the
haulage way for transport to the surface . . .Protecting
men and machinery is a row of hydraulically operated
steel roof supports - gigantic jacks in effect - which move
forward with the cutting machine. The whole operation
advances in a continuous line". (Coal Patrol, 1972).
Longwall mining is safer because the roof supports pro-
vide effective overhead protection, thus preventing roof
falls which continue to be the single major cause of fatal
accidents in mines in this country. In addition, with the
longwall method it is easier to ventilate a mining area and
it is easier to reduce the levels of dust in the air. In spite of
its advantages, longwall mining accounts for only a small
percentage of U.S. coal production. One of the problems
is that longwall mining requires an enormous initial
capital investment. Only those larger producers with suffi-
cient reserves against which to balance the necessary con-
version costs could possibly afford the change from room-
and-pillar methods to longwall mining. In the absence of
a long term production committment from a consumer,
domestic or otherwise, it is unlikely that many producers
will adopt this method, at least in the very near future.
By comparison with European
mining operations.., methods.
. . used in this country seem
hopelessly archaic and
dangerous.
While roof falls are the most prominent cause of death
in the mines, the disasters with which we are all familiar
are caused by the explosion of methane gas. European
mines are far more gassy than American mines and again
European operators have thus been forced to develop
methods which effectively deal with this problem. The
result is adoption of methane control methods far in
,advance of any used in this country. In Soviet mines, for
example, methane sensors line the longvall face. When
dangerous levels of methane are detected all electrical
equipment in the area is automatically shut off. Fans are
then used to draw the methane out of the mine. Such
"outgassing" is performed regularly both before and dur-
ing shifts and in some countries the methane recovered is
used for fuel. U.S. mines, by contrast, must rely upon
"the flicker of a safety lamp or the hand operated
methane monitor (as) the only way to guess the level of
methane gas". (J. Davitt McAteer You Can't Buy Sai'ty at
the Company Store, The Washington Monthly, Nov.
1972). Cbmpared to the sophisticated sensors found in
European mines, such protections are little better than
detection methods used at the turn of the century. In
those days, canaries were released near the mine face
prior to a shift and, presumably, if the canary survived,
the area was safe for workers.
The connection between pervasive levels of coal dust
and Black Lung is well known. Few realize, however, that
"Fine particles of coal dust hanging in suspension are
almost as volatile as methane, and when methane
explodes the dust nearby can spread the blast and turn a
local fire into a general holocaust." In American mines,
coal dust is kept down with rock 'dust; powdered
limestone spread on -the walls and floors of a working
mine area. In European mines it is recognized that rock
dusting is not enough, To supplement rock dusting,
operators use explosion barriers or platforms which hang
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from the ceiling and which fall, after the shock of an
explosion, dropping dust and/or water at various points
along the fire's expected path.
Hundreds of miners die each year from Black Lung and
each year hundreds more are compensated under the
Black Lung Benefits Program. It is significant that the
U.S. response to pneumoconiosis is a compensatory
approach, with little additional energy expended on the
development or implementation of preventive measures.
In European mines, dust suppression is an art. Among the
methods employed, the most effective is a water infusion
method which involves pumping water into the coal seam
before mining. Such a technique is used in only a fraction
of U.S. mines, despite its relatively low costs.
The fact that these and other improved mining
mehtods are not in place in U.S. mines, primarily because
of the presumed, or even real, adverse impact on profits is
deplorable. All the methods described have proven to be
effective in either mitigating or altogether eliminating
unsafe mining conditions and all are economically bur-
densome and thus rejected with impunity.
The Rushton Experiment: In 1973, UMWA members
and company officials at Rushton Mining Company's
mine in Pennsylvania agreed to an experiment in mine
safety based on similar experiments conducted in the Bri-
tish Coal Mines. The Rushton experiment described in
the November 1976 issue of The United Mine Workers
Journal, involved 'an approach which suggested that a
focus on day-to-day operations and working relationships
are in fact the keys to improved mining conditions. The
major features of the program, briefly stated, were:
"1) The company agreed to suspend its right to direct
the workforce under the UMWA contract.
2) Each crew was to direct its own work, withthe fore-
man having responsibility only for safety.
3) Training in job skills and safety requirements was
greatly expanded with the goal of teaching every crew
member how to do every job.
4) Accordingly, each crew member was paid top rate.
5) Grievances were settled, if possible, by a joint com-
mittee of elected representatives of each crew on the sec-
tion, local union leaders and management.
6) At all times, both sides retained the right to setttle
any unresolved disputes through the regular contract grie-
vance procedures, or to drop the program entirely.
7) The company and the miners were to share in any
increased profits which resulted from the new work
arrangement".
The program was in force for three years and was rooted
primarily in a theory which emphasized the importance of
miner control of working conditions. To that extent, the
experiment was considered radical. It depended entirely
upon a willing relinquishment of managerial oversight.
Such a relinquishment was both the key to the program's
success and the source of its demise. In the end, con-
troversy over the necessary degree of worker control
sufficient to accomplish the program's goals became
insurmountable. The result was that major portions of the
experiment were abandoned and only those portions
which periferally infringed on traditional managerial pre-
rogatives were allowed to continue. However,, for the
period in which the program operated intact, it was highly
successful, suggesting that improved health and safety in
the coal mines may depend upon an entirely new
approach to the employment relationship.
'A chronic and historic emphasis on production at the
cost of safety has long been characteristic of the coal
industry. Safety and health are clearly, in the end,
economic issues. As long as safety costs more than pro-
duction losses resulting from accidents or disasters or as
long as safety costs more than penalties assessed under
the law, we can expect little improvement in mining con-
ditions in this country. Clearly, more effective enforce-
ment of existing government regulations is preferred to a
pure market solution which suggests that the profit
motive is sufficient impetus to compel owners to improve
working conditions. Reliance on management to maintain
a safe and healthy workplace, in the absence of any effec-
tive compulsion to do so, is misplaced at best and, in fact,
foolish. Government regulation of mining conditions is,
however, by itself, not sufficient.
A safe mine may well be a productive mine but only if
production patterns necessary to produce reasonable
profits are kept stable. It is the nature of the process that
coal production, at any one single working face, has an
identifiable limit. Each mine, given current technology,
has a defined production capacity. Machines can only
work so fast and miners can only work so long. There is a
point at which a production emphasis, ,in disregard of
those inherent technological and human limits, can only
result in injury and death. The ultimate solution,
therefore, is not to cut back on or eliminate government
regulation but, in addition to maintaining the current
regulatory status quo (with some improvement in enfor-
cement), to refocus government oversight toward a con-
cern for production. The focus of government interven-
tion would be on rational production not simply produc-
tion aimed at a maximization of output and profits. It may
well be that rational production effectively imposed (with
effectiveness measured by the impact on mining condi-
tions and not on rates of return on capital investment)
will have a tendency to depress profits. In the calculus that
seeks to find a trade-off, however, among, I) mine safety,
2) production sufficient to meet 1981 energy needs, and
3) maintenance of excess profits; the third component is
the most expendible.
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